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How did the rapid growth of multilateralism and international collaboration after World War 
II (re-)constitute preservation practices in decolonizing countries? In order to overcome 
structural imbalances in international organizations like UNESCO, responses to this question 
have often argued that post-war preservation work reflected a neo-colonialist frame.
2
 I do not 
dispute the inequalities that UNESCO and related institutions (often continue to) embody, nor 
do I dispute the necessity of overcoming them. But in this paper, I am more interested in 
starting to understand the actions behind the production of such inequalities. Rather than 
taking these inequalities as natural, this understanding can provide an account of the forms of 
power that produced such imbalances and usefully highlight their historical contingency. As 
Tim Winter notes, “to label the founding of the new post-war intergovernmental landscape as 
merely Eurocentric or neo-imperialist would miss the important political spaces it would 
open up.”3 In this paper, I use this observation to think through the matter of preservation 
work in post-war Egypt, illustrating the growth of a multilateral discourse superficially 
benefiting Euro-Americans concerned with the excavation and preservation of ancient 
antiquities and architecture. Conversely, I then demonstrate how that discourse helped to 
materialize novel forms of Egyptian power.     
Egypt provides an excellent case study. A well-known literature frames (preservation 
and other) work related to ancient Egyptian remains squarely in terms of colonial-era 
contestation.
4
 Yet (how) did the history of contestation around such artifacts and architecture 
enable new modes of political power to become manifest there? The one substantive work 
dealing with this question concludes in the early 1940s, despite its author’s recognition that 
this temporal boundary is arbitrary.
5
 What happened after 1945 as Britain’s presence in Egypt 
weakened, the country’s monarch, Faruq, became increasingly unpopular, and various 
Egyptian and regional movements promoted political change?
6
 Before the war, many 
foreigners had become concerned about their ability to continue working with ancient 
Egyptian remains in the country. But what happened after 1945 as events gathered pace and, 
ultimately, Nasser became figurehead of a revolutionary nation-state? Below, I detail 
Egyptian responses to the forms of multilateralism that emerged around this time in relation 
to excavation and preservation work on the country’s ancient material culture. By doing so, I 
illustrate how these responses fused ancient remains with the alphabet soup of multilateralism 
in order to instantiate those remains as constitutive of political revolution.      
Multilateralism and ancient Egyptian material culture: beginnings 
 
First, though, I discuss the prehistory of these responses in order to illustrate the conditions 
which helped to form them. After 1945, the material culture of ancient Egypt had become 
embedded within the growing multilateral arena. To adopt multilateralism meant taking heed 
of a change in the way order in the world was represented; practitioners concerned with 
excavating and preserving Egypt’s ancient past were as likely to value this representation as 
others. Yet paying attention to multilateralism also meant reinforcing the unbalanced sort of 
governance that multilateral institutions tended to generate.      
In August 1947, less than two years after the Charter of the United Nations came into 
being, an international group of Egyptologists gathered at the University of Copenhagen to 
discuss the future of a discipline many of whose members (philologists, archaeologists and 
architects with an interest in ancient Egyptian material culture) had been riven apart by the 
Second World War.
7
 Reflecting residual tension relating to the conflict, Germans had not 
been invited, but representatives came to the meeting from all of Belgium, Britain, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Holland, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United States. Their gathering resulted in the foundation of an International Association of 
Egyptologists (IAE). The IAE (as this initial gathering suggests) was a veritable UN of the 
Egyptological world. Indeed, the organization promised that Germans could gain their 
membership if and when Germany (at that point still one country) became accredited as a 
member of the fledgling UNESCO.
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 Yet such conditionality also suggests that a primary 
purpose of the IAE was conducting “boundary work”: asking questions about (and also 




Much of the boundary work that occurred at Copenhagen seems innocuous. During 
the meeting, attendees discussed whether a new ancient Egyptian dictionary project should be 
started and based in Copenhagen. They also asked whether Egyptologists should publish 
articles outside of the discipline’s established journals. Beyond such discussions, though, 
attendees also formed a series of regulatory committees to advance the multilateral regulation 
of Egyptological practice, creating familiar issues related to such governance. For instance, 
the IAE’s steering committee was to be formed of eleven members from eleven different 
countries. Predictably, one representative was to be from the US, and another from the Soviet 
Union. Yet pointing to the way in which multilateral governance also helped to marginalize 
countries emerging from colonialism, only one representative was to be Egyptian: Sami 
Gabra, a (British and French trained) archaeologist from Fuʾad (now Cairo) University.10 
Given a long tradition of such marginalization during Egyptology’s colonial development, it 
is difficult not to interpret this act as much other than a use of multilateral rhetoric to 
perpetuate a status quo privileging foreign access to ancient Egyptian material.
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 At the time, 
at least one Egyptian Egyptologist stated that “through … the co-operation of scholars of all 
nations, Egyptology will undoubtedly prosper.”12 But the multilateral and internationalist 
rhetoric that they used also acted against their influence.       
 The IAE, as Donald Reid has noted, was “still-born.”13 But institutional failure does 
not mean that the sort of boundary work the IAE enacted did not live on elsewhere. Even 
after the Egyptian Free Officers’ coup of 1952, examples exist of international collaboration 
around ancient Egyptian remains promoting the continued primacy of European work relating 
to them. The coup heralded not only the start of Nasser’s rise to power, but also the first 
Egyptian director of the country’s Antiquities Service, now renamed the Department of 
Antiquities. Mustafa Amer was a geographer and prehistorian who believed in scientific 
internationalism; many of the Egyptian staff he managed also held similar ideals.
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 Particular 
foreign institutions with an interest in excavating in Egypt now took clear advantage of this 
situation, even as they also asserted the value of the work that they conducted in terms of the 
scientific recovery and preservation of the country’s past.  
For instance, in 1953, Britain’s Egypt Exploration Society (EES) gained a concession 
to dig at the site of Saqqara “on behalf of, and in collaboration with, the Department of 
Antiquities.”15 This internationalist language, however, was pure rhetoric: committee minutes 
reveal that the work provided an excuse to continue the earlier work of the British 
organization’s new Field Director, the archaeologist Walter Bryan Emery, who had excavated 
monumental tombs at the site while working for the Antiquities Service in the interwar 
period. Minutes also reveal that the EES’ committee saw the discovery and preservation of 
such tombs as providing a potential means of obtaining ancient Egyptian artefacts, 
presumably to distribute to supporters.
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 There is little doubt that Emery believed in the 
scientific importance of the work that he carried out. Yet there is also little doubt that he (and 
the institution that backed him) used the language of international collaboration to enable 
more cynical motives, too. 
 Nor was this practice limited to European institutions. During 1955 and 1956, the 
then-University Museum of the University of Pennsylvania (UM; now the University of 
Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology) conducted a collaborative 
excavation with the Department of Antiquities at the site of Mit Rahina (ancient Memphis), 
just south of Cairo.
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 To a large degree, collaboration in this case was again formulated to fit 
the foreign institution’s plans. Despite Egyptians (including Amer) making the initial moves, 
the excavation (novel in purpose) was formulated along the lines of the sort of technical 
assistance exercise promoted under the rubric of Truman’s Point Four program: a rubric that 
used such modernization work to embed American values in countries considered useful Cold 
War allies. In this instance, the UM (acting without the backing of the US government) 
offered to transfer archaeological skills at the same time as excavating a site most of which 
the Department of Antiquities was keen to return to agricultural use; the Free Officers had 
instigated a policy of limited land reform and redistribution, and Mit Rahina was of potential 
agricultural value.
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 The process of working out where at Mit Rahina excavation might 
continue—and which parts of the site should be preserved—would (or so its Board of 
Managers hoped) enable the American institution to embed itself in Egypt, giving it (like the 
EES) the prolonged opportunity to transport excavated artefacts back to Philadelphia. Rudolf 
Anthes, the German-born Egyptologist who the UM placed in charge of the excavation, 
believed in the progressive nature of the work that his field team would carry out. But, once 
again, collaboration also had ulterior motives.    
My concern in the remainder of this paper, however, is not in the details of such 
collaborative excavations per se. Instead, what interests me is the way that such international 
collaboration around material culture—and the growth of multilateralism in relation to the 
preservation of Egypt’s past more generally—started to enable Egyptian authorities to 
channel their own political wishes.  Both the programmatic technical collaboration advanced 
by the UM and also the much more lackadaisical collaboration of the EES failed, and failed 
due to the policies of the Egyptian government. To understand this process, I turn to another 
collaborative project involving the Department of Antiquities.   
 
Preserving ancient Nubia, multilaterally    
 
In late 1955, the Department published a volume entitled Report on the Monuments of Nubia 
Likely to be Submerged by Sudd-el-ʿĀli Water. The Report appeared as plans gathered pace 
for the construction of the new Aswan High Dam (the Sudd-el-ʿĀli), which was rapidly 
becoming the centerpiece of Egypt’s revolution.19 Within the publication’s pages, a 
committee of upper-level Department members attempted to regulate how the ancient 
monuments of Egyptian Nubia could be preserved and the sort of knowledge that could be 
gleaned from them recorded, before the reservoir (now Lake Nasser) that would form behind 
the Dam submerged them forever. The Report (written in Arabic, English, and French) 
constituted the ancient past as part of the contemporary process of revolutionary 
environmental transformation in Nubia. Moreover, it formalized this process of 
transformation as multilateral, attempting to make Nubia’s ancient material culture a 
“boundary object” around which various international interests could gather and subverting 
the strategy that foreign institutions had previously used.
20
 At the publication’s beginning, a 
reproduction of a letter from the Egyptologist Salim Hassan, leader of the departmental 
committee, assured Kamal al-Din Hussein, Egypt’s Minister of Education, “that Egypt . . . is 
capable of carrying out this project.” Yet Hassan also noted “the hearty welcome of the 
Egyptian archaeologists to the assistance of some of their foreign colleagues,” stating “that if 
UNESCO has any intention of presenting any pecuniary, material or scientific aid to Egypt . . 
. we have to thank it deeply.”21 
Several years later, in 1960, UNESCO launched an appeal on behalf of the Egyptian 
and Sudanese governments for what would become its International Campaign to Save the 
Monuments of Nubia.
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 A recent critical article (as does much official literature) seems to 
suggest that this event took place almost sui generis and was, to a significant extent, the result 
of UNESCO’s agency.23 Yet the 1955 Report begs us to rethink this interpretation: the 
publication makes it clear that plans for the Nubian campaign (and related attempts to make 
UNESCO become involved with it) were afoot long before 1960. Why, then, do these plans 
now seem almost forgotten? I argue that the transfer of agency to the multilateral auspices of 
UNESCO acted as a means (now lodged in the historiography) to conceal the way in which 
the Egyptian government had realized that it could start to use foreign interactions with 
ancient material culture in order to assert and represent its own political wishes. Constituting 
the Nubian campaign as a boundary object also meant constituting a novel set of power 
relations.  
The EES and the UM may have drawn on multilateralism and the rhetoric of 
collaboration to work in Egypt, but now the Egyptian government used this rhetoric in an 
attempt not only to regulate the practices of such institutions as they carried out their work, 
but also to manage the country’s wider political interests. The Report was one step in this 
process. Another step (also in 1955) involved moving beyond the publication’s 
internationalist rhetoric and mobilizing the resources of UNESCO in order to constitute the 
institutional framework within which this collaboration could be managed. That year, the 
Centre d’Étude et de Documentation sur l’Ancienne Égypte (or CEDAE) was established. 
CEDAE aimed to prepare for the forthcoming Nubian work by documenting antiquities, 
archaeological sites, and ancient monuments across the region and the wider country, and 
was formed under the terms of the UN’s Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. The 
agency resulted, then, from an official request made by Egypt’s Ministry of Education to 
UNESCO. And in a government memo establishing CEDAE’s formal basis within Egypt, 
Kamal al-Din Hussein emphasized the work that such a multilateral strategy could do for the 
country’s revolutionary future.  
Writing in April 1955, the Minister stated that CEDAE could be “a source for 
equipping them [Egyptians] with the history of human civilization,” confirming that Egypt 
constituted an example of a “universal civilization” (“ḥaḍāra ʿālamiyya”) and thereby 
utilizing the sort of language promoted under UNESCO’s auspices.24 But at the same time as 
using this language, Hussein also drew on contemporary rhetoric dealing with the reform of 
the Egyptian peasantry in order to stress that the institution could be “a means of educating 
sons of the country.”25 Furthermore, Hussein specified that a major rationale for CEDAE’s 
establishment centered on concerns that “many antiquities were exported outside Egypt 
without registration.”26 CEDAE had a revolutionary ordering mission, which the Arabic 
version of the agency’s name made clear: the Markaz Tasjil al-Athar al-Misriyya was the 
Centre for Registering (tasjīl) Egyptian Antiquities. Placing work relating to Egyptian 
antiquities within the multilateral realm could help to constitute Egyptian property and 
population, ancient and modern, whether in Nubia or more widely.  
Of course, this strategy came with conditions. Like other collaborative work, the 
foundation of CEDAE constituted expertise relating to Egypt’s (now universal) civilization as 
linked to an institutional world outside the country. The agreement establishing the Centre 
stated that CEDAE was founded “in light of recommendations in the report by the head of the 
UNESCO mission of experts” that had studied the initial Egyptian proposal. That mission 
head was the Egyptologist Christiane Desroches Noblecourt of the Louvre, and her 
recommendations included not only working practices, but also matters relating to 
“employees and an appropriate budget.”27 Yet even as Noblecourt headed CEDAE, this 
situation created opportunities for Egypt: the directives of the UN Program allowed that 
Egyptian officials become involved with carrying out work at the agency, too.  
More than other collaborative work taking place in the country, CEDAE therefore 
gave Egyptians a hand as their government pushed for foreign institutions to undertake 
excavation and preservation work in Nubia: the agency constituted Egypt’s past as a 
universal civilization, but to do so, it required accession to local demands as a matter of 
(almost moral) course.
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 Retiring from the leadership of the Department of Antiquities, Amer 
became CEDAE’s Egyptian director.29 Years later, Noblecourt reminisced that her work with 
CEDAE meant that “je fis la connaissance du professeur Mustafa Amer, dont la courtoisie et 
l’intelligence me sédusirent.” She also complimented Amer for his work in the Department of 
Antiquities, which she said that he had “insuffler un sang neuf [infused with a fresh blood], 
inspire par les experiences les plus modernes.”30 Noblecourt of course represented her 
dealings with Amer in this way: she wanted to suggest that their cooperation had been driven 
by a shared, internationalist belief in progress (which, to an extent, was true). Yet by 
acknowledging Amer’s influence, her statement also confirms the leverage that Egyptian 
officials enjoyed as their work became embroiled within multilateral discourse. As the 
Department of Antiquities continued to push for international collaboration in Nubia, these 
conditions meant that it would be difficult to ignore its requests. To do otherwise would be to 
undermine the apparently benign cultural cooperation that such conditions promoted.    
 
Making multilateralism stick 
 
Unfortunately for them, foreign institutions working in Egypt often ignored these conditions. 
The UM’s work at Mit Rahina provides a case in point. During the excavation’s second 
season in 1956, Anthes wrote to the institution’s director, Froelich Rainey, and informed him 
of Amer’s forthcoming move to CEDAE. He noted that “although I should no means 
recommend striking after a close connection . . . it seems to be wise to be present at work 
when the Center fully develops.”31 In Egypt, Anthes could see the course that events relating 
to antiquities were taking. But back in Philadelphia, no one listened to his advice, and the 
result was a clash with an emboldened Department of Antiquities. Multilateralism mattered.    
A distinct lack of success at Mit Rahina constituted the grounds for this clash. 
Excavating the site meant dealing with a confusing assortment of waterlogged architectural 
remains, and the planned transfer of archaeological skills there had failed, sunk in the site’s 
murky depths. Moreover, excavating this complex ancient settlement (a difficult process that 
was itself out of the ordinary in Egypt) did not yield the sort of ancient artefacts that the UM 
wanted to acquire. Acting unilaterally, the institution—and in particular its Board—therefore 
decided to end the collaborative excavations at the site: at first postponing a planned third 
season of work (using the 1956 Suez conflict and its aftermath as an excuse), but then 
cancelling it altogether.
32
 The Board agreed that the funds set aside for the work could be 
utilized to excavate elsewhere in the country “at some future date.”33 But this outcome—
particularly in terms of the UM’s desire to choose the location of such an excavation—did 
not arise, because the Department of Antiquities now decided to call the shots. If the UM 
chose to adopt multilateral rhetoric, the Department would force the institution to stick to that 
rhetoric or face the consequences. And in a climate of Cold War paranoia and revolutionary 
posturing, those consequences caused no small amount of concern.   
After Suez, a Polish archaeological mission had started excavating the mound of Tell 
Atrib, located just outside the Nile Delta city of Benha. While not excavating in the 
Department’s preferred location of Nubia, these representatives of the Warsaw Pact still 
looked magnanimous as they dug: in September 1957, the (government-produced) Egypt 
Travel Magazine, distributed worldwide, made clear that excavations at the site (a series of 
settlement layers in the Nile’s cultivation) fit well with the sort of work that Egypt now 
promoted through an agency like CEDAE. The excavations overcame the issue that “on 
cultivated lands the mounds are a nuisance and are steadily cut into. Hunters for antiques do 
further damage.” Now these mounds and the antiquities within them were registered and 
regulated, allowing the Magazine to claim that apart from Tell Atrib “no continuously 
inhabited town site from ancient Egypt has ever been properly excavated,” despite the site’s 
distinct similarity to Mit Rahina.
34
 This apparent Polish success caused deep disquiet. For 
example, the Newsletter of the American Research Center in Egypt noted that the Polish 
work had come about “as part of the cultural exchange between Egypt and Communist 
countries” and that “the [Egyptian] government is extending to them many courtesies and 
privileges.” Worse still, these courtesies included artefacts: “at the end of last year's 
excavation at Benha, the Polish Expedition was permitted to take back to Poland a share of 
the finds it has made.”35 Reacting to this situation, Helen Wall, a member of the UM’s Mit 
Rahina team, told Anthes that if western countries did not “fill that cultural vacuum,” then 
“the Egyptians will be forced to take people from the Russian zone.”36 
 The Department of Antiquities exploited this paranoia. Even before Rainey had 
written to the Department to cancel the Mit Rahina work, he reported that “he had received a 
letter from the Egyptian Government cancelling the Museum’s contract to work at Memphis. 
They have requested us to work at Nubia [sic].”37 Echoing the Department’s earlier Report, 
this letter, sent in October 1957, enclosed a list of Nubian sites, making clear that the UM 
could relocate its work only to these locations. The UM could either excavate in Nubia or 
forget about excavating in Egypt at all, leaving the country (and the future of its revolution) 
to archaeologists like the Poles.
38
 Meanwhile, other institutions also received the 
Department’s letter; the EES’ concerned committee concluded that “there was … no 
promising site among those listed.”39 The Department appeared to have engineered a fait 
accompli. Representing multilateral collaboration around ancient Egyptian material culture as 
taking the form of a benign boundary object allowed the Department to direct where 
excavation would occur, and perhaps even how. As Egypt asserted revolution, potential 
spaces of excavation—and the sorts of material held within them—played a meaningful role.  
 
Conclusion and discussion 
 
In post-war Egypt, making use of multilateral discourse relating to the excavation and 
preservation of ancient material culture allowed the country to assert its revolutionary wishes 
using (the promise of) interactions with the monuments and antiquities that that material 
culture comprised. The events detailed above only represent the start of this story. Despite the 
ultimatum that the Department of Antiquities presented to foreign institutions in 1957, the 
wholesale undertaking of archaeological work in Nubia remained uncertain, and only became 
a reality when UNESCO advanced its involvement beyond CEDAE to back a wider Nubian 
campaign. Egypt had to push the practice of multilateralism further than it perhaps wanted to. 
I do not have space to detail that process here. But the discussion above suggests that 
multilateralism ultimately made for uncomfortable archaeological bedfellows in Nubia, 
despite the internationalist rhetoric now attached to the eventual campaign there.    
 This situation prompts two thoughts. First, we need to re-examine what we think we 
know about the Nubian campaign. Little critical analysis has been directed toward the Nubian 
work, and the campaign is generally interpreted as a rare (preservationist) monument to 
internationalism in an otherwise heated political context. To what extent, then, was the utopia 
of the Nubian campaign a reality if, prior to its commencement, Egypt used multilateralism as 
a boundary object to assert itself in the face of the cynical use of such rhetoric by others? 
Only in-depth study will tell. Secondly, we also need to pry open the foundation myth 
attached to the Nubian work: that impetus for the creation of the 1972 World Heritage 
Convention to a great extent derived from the carrying out of the campaign there.
40
 Given 
events outlined above, (how) did countries reach agreement about the Convention at the same 
time as they played political games with each other? To what extent did World Heritage 
constitute a further boundary object to neutralize political battles around preservation and 
related fields? Given the events that I outline above, only a nuanced understanding of the 
Nubian campaign will enable us to answer this question.         
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